Agglomeration brings costs (e.g., intensi…ed local competition) as well as bene…ts (e.g., knowledge spillover). It is important to examine the net impact of agglomeration to understand the geographic distribution of economic activities. In this study, we use …rm markup (de…ned as the ratio of price over marginal cost) to capture the net impact of agglomeration. Using data from Chinese manufacturing …rms in the 1998-2005 period, we …rst recover the markup ratio for each …rm following De Locker and Warzynski (2012), and then use changes in industrial a¢liation as a quasi-experiment to identify the impact of agglomeration on …rm markup. Our di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) estimation shows that agglomeration has a negative impact on …rm markup, suggesting that the devastating competition e¤ect dominates the bene…cial spillover e¤ect in Chinese context. Moreover, we …nd that the impact of agglomeration on …rm markup varies across di¤erent industries and types of …rms.
Introduction
The geographic concentration of economic activities has been widely documented across countries and industries, for example, the manufacturing belt in the United States, the blue banana belt in the European Union, and the Paci…c coast industrial belt in Japan. 1 Although agglomeration brings about substantial positive spillover, 2 it also leads to greater competition 3 and, consequently, lower prices (e.g., Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse, 2002; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) . 4 An important yet overlooked question concerns the net e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm performance.
In this study, we use …rm markup (de…ned as the ratio of price over marginal cost) to investigate these two o¤setting e¤ects of agglomeration (namely, the bene…cial spillover e¤ect and the devastating competition e¤ect). The spillover e¤ect, on the one hand, is found to increase …rm productivity, 5 which results in lower marginal production costs and higher …rm markup. On the other hand, the competition e¤ect leads to lower market prices and lower …rm markup. Thus, …rm markup allows us to capture the net e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm performance. Furthermore, by looking at various scenarios in which the spillover e¤ect and the competition e¤ect may have di¤erent relative importance, we can further disentangle these two competing e¤ects of agglomeration on …rm performance.
There are, however, two empirical challenges to this research goal: how to calculate …rm markup; and how to identify the causal e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup. Firm-level data rarely contain information on product prices, let alone information on marginal costs. Additionally, more agglomerated industries may di¤er from less agglomerated industries in many other dimensions, compounding the e¤ect of agglomeration. Our study is the …rst 1 See Holmes and Stevens (2004) for a detailed description of the spatial distribution of economic activities in the United States and Canada; Combes and Overman (2004) for the case of the European Union; and Fujita, Mori, Henderson, and Kanemoto (2004) for the case of Japan and China. 2 The spillover may come from, for example, labor pooling, input sharing or knowledge spillover. For a literature review, see Rosenthal and Strange (2004) . 3 Comparably speaking, much less attention has been paid to the costs associated with agglomeration. The available studies have highlighted higher wages, higher rents and more congestion as costs of agglomeration. These costs are mostly indirect, compared with the impact of agglomeration on market prices. 4 Recently, there are two studies showing that market competition may increase prices under some conditions, i.e., Chen and Riordan (2008) ; Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2011). 5 For a review, see Melo, Graham, and Noland (2009) . We also …nd evidence for the positive impact of agglomeration on …rm productivity in the case of China's manufacturing industries in the 1998-2005 period (see Table A1 for details).
to use …rm markup to capture the net e¤ect of agglomeration. We also contribute to the literature by carefully addressing the two empirical issues mentioned above.
Speci…cally, following the recent work by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), we …rst recover the markup ratio for each …rm using standard …rm-level …nancial information such as output, capital, labor and materials. Next, as a quasi-experiment to identify the causal e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup, we explore a scenario in which some …rms change their industrial af…liations. Our identi…cation strategy relies on the comparison of the markup values of …rms that changed their industrial a¢liations (the treatment group) with the markup values of …rms that did not change their industrial af…liations (the control group) before and after the year of change, i.e., the di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) estimation.
The data for our study come from annual surveys of manufacturing …rms conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the 1998-2005 period. Our DID estimation …nds that agglomeration has a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on …rm markup, implying that overall in China the direct costs of agglomeration caused by enhanced competition outweigh the bene…ts of agglomeration. To ensure the validity of our DID estimation, we conduct the following series of robustness checks on the identi…cation assumption of the DID estimation and other estimation concerns:
Check whether the treatment and control groups have di¤erential time trends in the pre-treatment period Allow …rms in the treatment and control groups to follow di¤erent time trends Include more …rm-level controls to check whether the treatment and control groups are balanced Use an outcome variable that is not supposed to be a¤ected by the change in industrial a¢liation as a placebo test Measure Ellison-Glaeser's industrial agglomeration index at three different geographic scopes (i.e., province, city, or county), as a check on the sensitivity of the index to geographic scopes (the so-called modi…-able area unit problem, see Arbia, 2001) Exclude …rms with extreme markup ratios, to address the concern that our results could be driven by a few outlying observations Examine the one-shot e¤ect of the change in industrial a¢liation to rule out the concern that our DID estimator may capture the e¤ect of other events happening later in the post-treatment period De…ne the change of industrial a¢liation at the two-digit industry level to address the concerns about the misreporting of industrial a¢liation Control for the omitted price bias in the estimation of the production function by following Klette and Griliches (1996) 's method Incorporate the role of agglomeration into the estimation of the production function
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we investigate the di¤eren-tial e¤ects of agglomeration on …rm markup across di¤erent industries and types of …rms, which allows us to disentangle the two o¤setting e¤ects of agglomeration.
First, despite three decades of economic reform in China, the state still plays an important and dominant role in the economy. State-owned enterprises, protected by the central and local governments, enjoy various favorable policies and are shielded from local competition. As a result, agglomeration is expected to have a less damaging impact on markup for state-owned enterprises than on markup for non-state-owned enterprises. Indeed, we …nd that the impact of agglomeration on markup is statistically insigni…cant for state-owned enterprises, whereas it is negative and signi…cant for non-stateowned enterprises.
Second, given the established production technologies and stagnant market demand in mature industries, as compared to fast-growing industries, the devastating competition e¤ect vis-à-vis the bene…cial spillover e¤ect is expected to be more prominent and, consequently, the negative net impact of agglomeration more pronounced in the former industries than in the latter. Following the classi…cation method of Henderson et al. (1995) , we divide industries into mature industries and fast-growing industries. As expected, the impact of agglomeration on markup is negative and signi…cant for mature industries, but is insigni…cant for fast-growing industries.
Third, for industries producing goods for nationally integrated markets, the negative competition e¤ect of agglomeration is muted, although the positive spillover e¤ect remains intact, implying a less negative or even a positive impact of agglomeration on …rm markup. Following the de…nition of Rauch (1999), we divide industries into those with goods traded at exchanges, those with reference-prices, and other industries. It is found that the impact of agglomeration on markup is positive and signi…cant for industries with goods traded at exchanges, but remains negative and signi…cant for the other two types of industries.
Our study is related to an emerging literature on …rm markup. Studies along this line include those on markup estimation methodologies (Roeger, 1995; Klette, 1999; De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012) , and various factors affecting markup ratios such as anti-trust policy (Warzynski, 2001 ), trade policy (Konings and Vandenbussche, 2005) , privatization and competition (Konings, Cayseele, and Warzynski, 2005) , and exporting behavior (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the estimation method of …rm markup, and our strategy for identifying the e¤ect of agglomeration. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Empirical results regarding the e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup are reported in Section 4. The paper concludes with Section 5.
A Brief Discussion of Theories of Agglomeration and Firm Markup
Current theories of trade and urban economics o¤er very limited analysis of how agglomeration a¤ects …rm markup. Previous researchers have examined the e¤ect of agglomeration on product prices, but they generally assume that …rm productivity (and hence marginal production costs) is constant. As a result, the e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup mostly comes from the price channel. In this section, we brie ‡y discuss two leading models of this literature, and investigate how agglomeration a¤ects …rm markup when …rm productivity is positively a¤ected by agglomeration. Krugman (1979 Krugman ( , 1980 uses the monopolistic competition model developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to examine the pattern of agglomeration. This has been the most in ‡uential model in the trade and urban literature. This model was later modi…ed by Melitz (2003) to incorporate …rm heterogeneity, that is, …rms with di¤erent productivity levels. The core element of Krugman's model is that the preference of the representative consumer is characterized by the CES utility function, and market competition is modeled as monopolistic competition. As a result, each …rm produces a unique variety and charges a constant markup, a natural consequence of which is that agglomeration does not have any e¤ect on each individual …rm's markup. Though neither Krugman (1979) nor Melitz (2003) considers the possibility that agglomeration increases …rm productivity, incorporating this fact does not change the result; agglomeration still does not a¤ect …rm markup.
Speci…cally, agglomeration lowers both …rm productivity and price, but these two e¤ects cancel each other out so that on balance …rm markup does not change.
Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse's (2002) alternative model addresses the unsatisfactory feature of constant markup. In their model, the preference of the representative consumer is modeled as a quasi-linear utility with a quadratic subutility. Given the assumption of constant …rm productivity, the model generates the result that agglomeration lowers …rm price and further lowers …rm markup. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) 
Estimation Methodologies
In this section, we discuss the method for estimating …rm markup, and the estimation strategy for identifying the e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup.
Estimation of Firm Markup
To recover …rm-level markup, we follow the recent work of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) . Speci…cally, we assume that …rm i at time t has the following production technology
where L it , K it , and M it are the inputs of labor, capital, and intermediate materials, respectively; ! it denotes …rm-speci…c productivity. The production function F (:) is assumed to be continuous and twice-di¤erentiable with respect to all of its arguments.
Consider the following cost minimization problem faced by …rm i at time t
where w it , r it , and p m it denote the wage rate, rental price of capital, and the price of intermediate inputs, respectively; and Q it is a given number of output.
The estimation of …rm-level markup hinges upon the choice of an input that is free of any adjustment costs, and the estimation of its output elasticity. As labor is largely not freely chosen in China (particularly for state-owned enterprises) and capital is often considered a dynamic input (as a result of which its output elasticity is di¢cult to interpret), we choose intermediate materials as the input to estimate …rm markup (see also De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). Speci…cally, the Lagrangian function associated with the optimization problem (2) can be written as
Hence, the …rst-order-condition for intermediate materials is
Re-arranging equation (4) and multiplying both sides by
where P it is the price of the …nal good. Note that it = @L @Q it = mc it represents the marginal cost of production at a given level of output, and de…ne …rm markup it as the ratio of price over marginal cost, i.e., it
. Hence, equation (5) 
where
is the output elasticity of intermediate materials and
is the share of the expenditure of intermediate materials in total revenue.
As the information about the expenditure on intermediate materials and total revenue is available in the data, m it can be readily calculated. However, the output elasticity of intermediate materials, m it ; needs to be obtained through the estimation of the production function (1). There is a large literature on the estimation of the production function focusing on how to control for unobserved productivity shocks (see Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes, 2007, for a review). The solutions range from the instrumental variable estimation, to the GMM estimation, and to the control function approach proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) . We adopt the control function approach developed by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazier (2006), which comprises a two-steps estimation. 8 The production function to be estimated is expressed as
where the lower case letters represent the logarithm of the upper case letters; = ( l ; k ; m ) is the vector of the production function coe¢cients, or the output elasticities; ! it is the total factor productivity (TFP); and " it is an i.i.d. error term. In Appendix A, we lay out the details of the procedure for estimating the production function.
We estimate the translog production function (7) separately for each twodigit industry. After we recover the coe¢cient of the intermediate materials in the production function^ m , …rm markup can be calculated based on equation (6)
. Several caveats are worth noting. First, the above framework implicitly assumes a single-product …rm. In reality, however, …rms may produce a range of products. In the absence of detailed information on the amounts of inputs used for each product, the markup calculated in equation (8) should be interpreted as the average markup across all products for a …rm. The existence of multi-product …rms should not, in any case, a¤ect our identi…cation strategy for the e¤ect of agglomeration on markup because our identi…cation utilizes the variations in markup over time for the same …rm.
Second, the estimation of the production function requires an observation of the quantity of …rm-level output. Unfortunately, such information is not available in most of the …rm-level data sets, including ours. As a compromise, the quantity-based output is recovered by de ‡ating the observed revenue with the industry-level price index, which is subject to the omitted price bias as pointed out by Klette and Griliches (1996) . However, this may not be a concern in the context of our study. The omitted price bias a¤ects the level of the estimated markup, whereas our identi…cation relies on the di¤erences in the estimated markup across time and across …rms (see De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012, for more discussion on this point). Nonetheless, in a robustness check, we follow Klette and Griliches (1996) to control for this potential omitted price bias in the estimation of the production function.
Third, it is widely documented that agglomeration positively a¤ects …rm productivity, and consequently the estimation of the production function. To address this concern, in a robustness check we revise the estimation procedure of the production function by explicitly incorporating the role of agglomeration. See Appendix B for details of the revised estimation procedure.
Identi…cation of the E¤ect of Agglomeration on Firm Markup
To illustrate our identi…cation strategy for the e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup, we adopt the Rubin causal model. Assume that for …rm i of industry j at time t, we can observe two potential outcomes, Y The e¤ect of agglomeration can be then calculated as
where = c when the outcome variable is the logarithm of marginal cost; = P when the outcome variable is the logarithm of price; and = when the outcome variable is the logarithm of markup. In the baseline analysis, we estimate the average treatment e¤ect, that is, i;t = . While in the second part of the empirical analysis, we allow the treatment e¤ect to vary across di¤erent industries and di¤erent types of …rms.
It is expected that c < 0, implying that …rms have lower marginal costs in more agglomerated areas (that is, the positive spillover e¤ect). It is also generally expected that P < 0, implying that agglomeration generally reduces …rm prices (that is, the negative competition e¤ect). And
captures the net of these two e¤ects of agglomeration (spillover versus competition e¤ects). Speci…cally, if > 0, we have 0 > P > c , which implies that the spillover e¤ect dominates the competition e¤ect. And if < 0, we have the opposite …nding, that is, the competition e¤ect is larger than the spillover e¤ect.
However, in observational data like ours, we are only able to observe one of the two potential outcome values, that is, either
. This makes the calculation described in equation (9) unfeasible. To retrieve the e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup (i.e., ), we exploit a quasi-natural experiment, that is, we use a sample of …rms that changed their industrial a¢liation during the sample period, to conduct a DID analysis.
Speci…cally, assume that a treatment …rm i changed its industrial a¢lia-tion from industry j 0 to industry j at time t i0 . The control …rm is a …rm from the same prior industry j 0 (and with several similar …rm characteristics) that did not change industrial a¢liation. The indicator of the treatment status T reatment i is denoted as
Our DID estimator is
There are two identi…cation assumptions in our DID estimation. The …rst identi…cation assumption, (12) , re ‡ects the potential e¤ect due to the change of industrial a¢liation but without the change in the degree of agglomeration. The second identi…cation assumption, (13) , requires the treatment group to have followed the trend of the control group in markup changes, if they had not changed industrial a¢liation. As long as our identi…cation assumptions are satis…ed (i.e., IA1 = 0 and IA2 = 0), our DID estimator recovers the true e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup, i.e., DID = . 9 In regression form, the DID estimation has the following speci…cation
where t is the time dummy, capturing those factors common to all …rms at time t; i is the …rm dummy, capturing …rm i's all time-invariant characteristics; P ost it indicates the post-treatment period for …rm i and is de…ned as follows
and " j it is the error term. is our key interest, representing the e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup. To deal with the potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we cluster the standard errors at the …rm level following Bertrand, Du ‡o, and Mullainathan (2004) .
Note that the inclusion of T reatment i P ost it controls for the identi…ca-tion assumption (12) , that is, any e¤ects due to the change in the industrial a¢liation, beyond the change in the degree of agglomeration. In other words, whether the estimated coe¢cient~ from equation (14) captures the true effect only hinges upon the satisfaction of the identi…cation assumption (13), i.e.,~ = + IA2 and IA2 = 0 )~ = . Below, we discuss a few estimation issues, especially the checks on the identi…cation assumption (13) .
First, to improve the comparability between the treatment and control groups, we construct a matched control group, that is, una¤ected …rms (i.e., those without changes in their industrial a¢liation) in the same prior treatment industry and with similar …rm characteristics. Speci…cally, we …rst estimate the probability of changing industrial a¢liation based on …rm markup, size, age, productivity, ownership structure, and industry and year dummies. The matched control …rm is the …rm with the closest predicted probability as that of the focus treatment …rm.
Second, the change in industrial a¢liation is de…ned at the three-digit industry level. To relieve the concern of misreporting industrial a¢liation, we restrict the selection to permanent changers, that is, we exclude those …rms that changed industrial a¢liation many times in the sample period. As a further check on the potential misreporting issue, we repeat the analysis for changes de…ned at the two-digit industry level.
Third, one way to check whether the identi…cation assumption (13) holds is to examine whether the assumption is satis…ed for several years before the treatment happened, i.e.,
A …nding of IA2 s = 08s may imply that our identi…cation assumption (13) also holds. The corresponding regression speci…cation of this robustness check is
and the joint test of s = 0 implies IA2 s = 08s, lending support to our identi…cation assumption (13) . Fourth, …rms in the treatment and control groups may follow di¤erent time trends, which may compound our DID estimator. To address this concern, we allow …rm-speci…c time trends in our DID estimation. The new regression speci…cation becomes
and our identi…cation assumption (13) is relaxed as
Fifth, if the treatment and control groups are balanced (and hence the identi…cation assumption (13) holds), the inclusion of additional …rm-level controls should not signi…cantly change the DID estimator. As a check, we include a number of …rm characteristics (X it ) in the DID estimation. The new regression speci…cation becomes
Sixth, as a placebo test, instead of looking at …rm markup as the outcome variable, we examine an alternative outcome variable z j it that is not supposed to be a¤ected by the change in industrial a¢liation. Hence, the DID estimator of z j it is similar to equation (11), i.e., z DID = z +IA1 z +IA2 z . As z = 0 and IA1 z is controlled in the regression, the estimator z DID is reduced to as
z . A …nding of z DID = 0 means IA2 z = 0, which implies the satisfaction of our identi…cation assumption (13) . For the choice of outcome variable z j it , we use an indicator of whether a …rm changed its ownership structure, e.g., from state-owned enterprise to private enterprise. The premise is that a change in industrial a¢liation should not systematically lead to a change in ownership structure.
Data and Variables
The data for this study comes from the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Firms conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the period of 1998 to 2005. It is the most comprehensive …rm-level data set in China.
The survey covers all state-owned enterprises and those non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales of …ve million Renminbi (Chinese currency) or more. The number of enterprises in the sample ranges from 149,556 in 1998 to 244,315 in 2005. These …rms are distributed among 29 two-digit or 171 three-digit manufacturing industries, and across 31 provinces, 344 cities, and 2,829 counties.
During the sample period, there were several changes in China's administrative boundaries and consequently in the county or city codes in our data set. For example, new counties were established, while existing counties were combined into larger ones or even elevated to cities. Using the 1999 National Standard (promulgated at the end of 1998 and called GB/T 2260-1999) as the benchmark codes, we convert the regional codes of all the …rms to these benchmark codes to achieve consistency in the regional codes throughout the sample period. Meanwhile Our DID analysis uses the change of industrial a¢liation of …rms over the sample period. A total of 29,399 …rms changed their three-digit industrial a¢liations during the sample period; they comprise our treatment group. 10 There are a total of 27,050 …rms in the matched control group. 11 Deleting observations missing valid information for key variables (such as output and inputs), we end up with a …nal regression sample of 214,138.
To measure the degree of agglomeration, we follow the method developed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) , which tackles the large plant issue su¤ered by other measures of agglomeration. Ellison and Glaeser's index (henceforth referred to as the EG index) is constructed as follows:
2 is the spatial Gini coe¢cient, with s j rt being the share of region's r employment in industry j in the total country's employ- 10 Note that in constructing the treatment group, we exclude …rms that changed their industrial a¢liations more than once over the sample period, to alleviate the concern of misreporting. 11 The number of …rms in the control group is slightly below that in the treatment group because replacement is allowed in the matching process. ment of this industry at year t; and s rt being the share of region r's total manufacturing employment in the country's total at year t; and
is the Her…ndahl index of industry j at year t, with h ejt standing for the output share of a particular …rm e in industry j. The EG index, which is essentially the di¤erence between the Gini coe¢cient and the Her…ndahl index, measures the degree of industrial agglomeration beyond the level implied by the industrial structures. In the main analysis, we measure the EG index by using the city as the geographic unit. For robustness checks, we also measure the EG index using the county and the province as the geographic unit.
Control variables used in the analysis include: …rm size (measured as the logarithm of total employment), …rm age (measured as the logarithm of years of establishment), exporter status (a dummy variable indicating whether a …rm is an exporter or not), and foreign …rm status (a dummy variable indicating whether a …rm is registered as a foreign …rm). Table 1 lists the average markup for the 29 two-digit manufacturing industries. Generally, monopolized industries have the highest average markup values, for example, tobacco processing (1:54), medical and pharmaceutical products (1:47), and petroleum processing, coking products, and gas production and supply (1:37). Industries with the lowest average markup are garments and other …ber products (1:16), leather, furs, down and related products (1:17) , and the textile industry (1:21), which have low entry barriers and numerous small …rms.
Empirical Findings

Descriptive Analysis
[Insert Table 1 ] Figure 1 presents the unconditional correlation between the EG index and average markup at the two-digit industry level. There is a clear, negative correlation between the EG index and markup, implying that overall agglomeration has a negative impact on markup in China.
[Insert Figure 1 
Baseline Results
Our baseline DID estimation results, corresponding to equation (14) , are reported in Column 1 of Table 2 . It is found that the estimated coe¢cient of T reatment i P ost it is statistically insigni…cant and close to 0 in magnitude. This implies that when the degree of agglomeration does not change, the change in industrial a¢liation does not have an e¤ect on …rm markup.
[Insert Table 2] With respect to our central issue, the estimated coe¢cient ( DID ) of EG j t P ost it is negative and highly signi…cant. This result implies that the increase in the degree of agglomeration reduces …rm markup, which is consistent with Figure 1 . In terms of magnitude, a one-standard-deviation increase (i.e., 0:469) in the degree of agglomeration causes …rm markup to drop by 4:3%.
Note that in the aforementioned estimation, we include …rms from all 171 three-digit manufacturing industries in the same regression and estimate only one coe¢cient DID . Hence, the estimated coe¢cient DID represents the average e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup in China across all industries. This implies that overall in China agglomeration has a negative e¤ect on …rm markup. In other words, in China, the devastating competition e¤ect dominates the bene…cial spillover e¤ect, i.e., j c j > P . There are two possible explanations for this. First, China's market has been highly fragmented due to its low economic development on the one hand and local protectionism on the other, which limits the degree of inter-regional competition. In other words, market competition comes mostly from local competitors. As a result, the competition e¤ect brought by industrial agglomeration is …ercer in China, compared with countries that have nationally integrated markets and nationwide market competition. Second, there is limited opportunity for …rms in China to learn from competitors located nearby, because China has specialized in low value added manufacturing industries and low value added segments of manufacturing industries. Taken together, these factors have led to the domination of the competition e¤ect of agglomeration over the spillover e¤ect of agglomeration in China.
Checks on the Identi…cation Assumption of the DID Estimation
In this sub-section, we report a series of sensitivity checks, as discussed in Section 2.2, on the identi…cation assumption (13) . Pre-treatment di¤erential time trends. The …rst robustness check on the validity of our DID estimation examines whether the identi…cation assumption (13) holds in the pre-treatment period. Regression results according to equation (17) are presented in Column 2 of Table 2 . The insignif-icant joint test (F-test) of 1 and 2 gives no evidence for any di¤erential time trends between the treatment and control groups in the two years before the treatment, lending support to our identi…cation assumption (13) . Therefore, our main …nding on the e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup remains robust.
Firm-speci…c time trend. One further concern is that …rms in the treatment and control group may follow di¤erent time trends over the whole sample period, which may then compound our …ndings. To address this concern, we allow …rm-speci…c time trends in the DID estimation. Regression results according to equation (18) are reported in Column 3 of Table 2 . Clearly, our main …nding on the e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup remains robust to the inclusion of …rm-speci…c time trends, despite the fall in the magnitude of the estimated coe¢cient.
Additional controls. A corollary of the satisfaction of our identi…ca-tion assumption (13) is that the inclusion of additional controls in the DID estimation should not signi…cantly change the DID estimate as the treatment and control groups are balanced. Hence, we repeat our DID analysis with the addition of several …rm characteristics such as …rm size, …rm age, productivity, foreign …rm status, and exporter status. Regression results according to equation (20) are reported in Column 4 of Table 2 . It is found that our regressor of interest, EG j t P ost it , remains negative and statistically signi…cant. Although the estimated coe¢cient increases a little bit, it is not statistically di¤erent from the corresponding number in our baseline estimation.
Placebo test. The use of an outcome variable (z) that is not supposed to be a¤ected by our treatment allows us to check whether our identi…ca-tion assumption (13) holds or not. Regression results using the indicator of changing …rm ownership structure as the dependent variable are reported in Column 5 of Table 2 . Clearly, the regressor of interest, EG j t P ost it , becomes highly insigni…cant and close to 0 in magnitude. This result means that our identi…cation assumption (13) holds, implying our baseline DID estimation is not biased due to some underlying compounding factors.
Other Robustness Checks
In this sub-section, we report some further robustness checks on our aforementioned …ndings.
EG indices at alternative geographic scopes. Thus far our analysis uses city as the geographic unit to measure the degree of agglomeration. One concern is whether our …ndings are sensitive to the choice of geographic scope, or the so-called modi…able area unit problem (Arbia, 2001 ). To ad-dress this concern, we repeat our analysis using both province and county as the geographic scopes to measure the degree of agglomeration. Regression results are reported in Columns 1-2 of Table 3 . It is found that agglomeration continues to cast a negative and statistically signi…cant impact on …rm markup, implying that our …ndings are not driven by the choice of geographic scope.
[Insert Table 3 ]
One-shot e¤ect. The use of multiple periods in our DID analysis raises the concern that the DID estimator captures the variations of agglomeration due to events that happened in the post-treatment period. To alleviate this concern, we restrict the post-treatment period to one year after the change in industrial a¢liation. Regression results are reported in Column 3 of Table 3 . It is found that agglomeration still has a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect and the magnitude is even stronger. This result implies that DID estimate identi…ed in Table 2 is not caused by events occurring after the change in industrial a¢liation.
Exclusion of outliers. Another concern is whether our …ndings are driven by some outlying observations. To address this concern, we exclude …rms whose markup values are at the top or bottom 1% of the entire sample. Regression results are reported in Column 4 of Table 3 . Clearly, our main …ndings on the negative e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup remain robust, implying that the concern about outliers is not relevant in this context.
Change at the two-digit industry. One possible concern is that …rms may misreport their industrial a¢liations, which would invalidate our DID setting. In the above analysis, we restrict our analysis to a sample of …rms that during the whole sample period either did not change their industrial a¢liations (the control group), or changed only once (the treatment group), which may reduce the problem of misreporting. As a further check, we de…ne the treatment group as …rms that changed their industrial a¢liations once at the two-digit industry level; misreporting is less likely at this level than at the three-digit industry level. Regression results are reported in Column 5 of Table 3 . We still …nd a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup, implying the validity of our DID setting.
Control for omitted price bias in the estimation of production function. As our data does not have price information, we recover output in quantity by de ‡ating output in value with the industry price index. This may bias the estimated coe¢cients of production function (Klette and Griliches, 1996) . However, the omitted price bias should not a¤ect our DID estima-tion as our identi…cation uses the double-di¤erenced instead of the level of estimated coe¢cients of production function. Nonetheless, we conduct a further robustness check by using the method proposed by Klette and Griliches (1996) to control for the omitted price issue in the estimation of production function. Regression results are reported in Column 6 of Table 3 . Consistent with our previous …ndings, agglomeration still has a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on …rm markup, implying that the omitted price bias in the estimation of production function does not drive our …ndings.
Incorporating the role of agglomeration into the estimation of production function. As agglomeration is found to a¤ect …rm productivity, it is possible that it could also a¤ect our estimation of production function. As a robustness check, we explicitly incorporate the role of agglomeration into our estimation of production function. The DID estimation results are reported in Column 7 of Table 3 . Again, our main …ndings remain robust to the control for the role of agglomeration in the estimation of production function.
Heterogeneous Responses
Our results thus far demonstrate a negative impact of agglomeration on …rm markup, implying that, on the whole, the devastating competition e¤ect dominates the bene…cial spillover e¤ect in China. In this sub-section, we look at several scenarios in which these two o¤setting e¤ects have di¤erent relative importance, so that we can disentangle them.
SOEs versus non-SOEs. A unique feature of China's economic reform is its gradualism, that is, the state retains dominant control of the economy (Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 1999) . Indeed, China still retains a signi…cant amount of state ownership, despite thirty years of economic reform (CAI JING Magazine, 2007). As the privileged children of the state, state-owned enterprises enjoy numerous favorable policies. For example, state-owned enterprises have easy access to bank loans, while non-state-owned enterprises are typically denied access to bank loans (Li, 2001 ). And, as sources of …scal revenue and employment, state-owned enterprises are strongly protected by local governments and, hence, shielded from local competition. As a result, it is expected that the devastating competition e¤ect brought by industrial agglomeration will be smaller for state-owned enterprises than for non-state owned enterprises. In addition, state-owned enterprises are found to bene…t more from spillover than non-state-owned enterprises, presumably due to heavy government investment and the resulting technical capabilities (e.g., Hale and Long, 2011) . Taken together, it is expected that the net impact of agglomeration on …rm markup will be less negative or even positive for state-owned enterprises. These hypotheses are supported by our analysis. Columns 1-2 of Table 4 show that for the sub-sample of state-owned enterprises, the impact of agglomeration on …rm markup is statistically insigni…-cant, whereas for the sub-sample of non-state-owned enterprises, the impact of agglomeration on …rm markup is negative and signi…cant.
[Insert Table 4 ]
Mature versus fast-growing industries. In industries with fast growth rates, …rms enjoy the expansion of markets. As a result, the negative, local competition brought by industrial agglomeration is less …erce. However, in mature industries with barely any growth, …rms compete for limited numbers of clients, as a result of which industrial agglomeration brings stronger local competition. Furthermore, in mature industries with established technologies, industrial agglomeration does not have a strong bene…cial spillover e¤ect. Indeed, Henderson (2003) …nds no signi…cant impact of agglomeration on …rm productivity in mature industries. In summary, it is expected that the relative importance of the competition e¤ect over the spillover e¤ect will be more prominent in mature industries than in fast-growing industries. In other words, the net impact of agglomeration on …rm markup should be more negative in mature industries, but less negative or even insigni…cant in fast-growing industries.
To divide industries into mature industries and fast-growing industries, we follow the classi…cation of Henderson et al. (1995) . Speci…cally, mature industries are de…ned as those that experience no growth at all during our sample period, and fast-growing industries are de…ned as those that experience 100% employment growth during the sample period. 12 We also experiment with an alternative classi…cation of mature industries (i.e., those with growth rates < 20% ) and fast-growing industries (i.e., those with growth rates > 150%). Regression results for the subsamples of fast-growing and mature industries are shown in Columns 3-6 of Table 4 . Consistent with the above argument, the impact of agglomeration on …rm markup turns out to be insigni…cant for fast-growing industries, whereas the negative impact of agglomeration on …rm markup is negative and statistically signi…cant for the mature industries.
Homogenous versus di¤erentiated industries. The devastating competition e¤ect brought by industrial agglomeration largely stems from the enhanced opportunity for consumers to search for the lowest prices. If the prices of the relevant goods are publicly available, industrial agglomeration does not bring any extra localized competition. As long as there is some bene…cial spillover e¤ect from agglomeration, the net impact of agglomeration on markup should be less negative or even positive for industries/goods for which the price information is publicly available. Following the classi…cation of Rauch (1999), we divide industries into three categories in declining order of the degree of public informativeness of prices: those with goods traded at exchanges (denoted as Homogenous), those with goods for which there are some reference prices (denoted as Reference), and the remaining industries (denoted as Di¤erentiated). Regression results are reported in Columns 7-9 of Table 4 . Consistent with the above argument, we …nd a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of agglomeration on …rm markup in industries with goods traded at exchanges, but signi…cant and negative e¤ects in industries with reference prices and the remaining industries.
Conclusion
The study of the geographic distribution of economic activities across countries and regions dates back at least to the days of Alfred Marshall (see Book 4, Chapter 10 of Principles of Economics (1890)). An intriguing phenomenon uncovered by research in this area is the geographic clustering of …rms concentrating on the provision of certain goods or services. Subsequent research has focused on the bene…ts of agglomeration, which are related to decreases in the costs of production due to the positive spillover e¤ect. However, comparably much less attention has been paid to the costs of agglomeration. While acknowledging the importance of some of the indirect costs of agglomeration (such as congestion) discussed in the literature, we believe a much neglected, direct cost of agglomeration is enhanced competition brought out by agglomeration. To fully understand the geographic distribution of economic activities, it is imperative to examine the costs as well as bene…ts of agglomeration.
Given that the negative competition e¤ect of agglomeration lowers prices, whereas the positive spillover e¤ect lowers the marginal production costs, in this paper, we use …rm markup (de…ned as the ratio of price over marginal cost) as a simple and comprehensive measure to capture the net impact of agglomeration. Following a methodology recently developed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), we …rst estimate the markup ratio for each …rm from the data set of Chinese manufacturing …rms in the 1998-2005 period. To identify the causal impact of agglomeration on …rm markup, we use a scenario in which some …rms change their industrial a¢liations as a quasi-experiment. Our DID estimation shows that the overall impact of agglomeration on …rm markup is negative, suggesting the dominance of the negative competition e¤ect over the positive spillover e¤ect in the Chinese context. Our results are robust to various sensitivity checks on the satisfaction of our DID identi…cation assumption and other estimation issues. Furthermore, we …nd that the impacts of agglomeration on …rm markup vary across di¤erent industries and types of …rms, as the relative strength of the negative competitive e¤ect versus the positive spillover e¤ect varies under di¤erent circumstances.
Our research highlights the importance of examining the costs as well as the bene…ts of agglomeration. It contributes to the economic geography literature by demonstrating the use of markup ratio as a measure of the net impact of agglomeration. Our …ndings on the negative impact of agglomeration on markup, based on data from China's manufacturing …rms, suggest there are limits to agglomeration, as …rms need to balance the lower production costs a¤orded by agglomeration against the lower prices caused by enhanced competition. Furthermore, our …ndings call for more studies on the net impact of agglomeration using data from other countries and regions. and hence is not correlated with it ( ). In addition, wage rates and prices of intermediate materials are assumed to vary across …rms and be serially correlated. Therefore, the moment conditions used to estimate the coe¢cients of the production function are
Appendix B: Incorporating the Role of Agglomeration into the Estimation of the Production Function
Agglomeration has been found to positively a¤ect …rm productivity, which may raise the concern that it could then potentially a¤ect the production function. To address this concern, we explicitly incorporate the role of agglomeration into the estimation procedure of the production function. Specifically, …rm productivity is assumed to follow the following Markov movement
where agglomeration jt 1 is the degree of agglomeration in industry j (for which …rm i belongs to) at time t 1. Other procedures are similar to those in Appendix A. Note: We define fast-growing industries as those whose total employment growth rate in the 1998-2005 period is above 100%, mature industries as those whose total employment growth rate in the 1998-2005 period is below 0%.
